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Abstract 
Purpose  
This paper reports the results of an investigation into the relationship between corporate boards 
and the likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence in the United 
Kingdom (UK). 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach 
The study uses a probit model to analyse the relationship between corporate boards and the 
likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence in the UK, controlling for 
firm size, financial leverage and profitability. 
 
Findings 
The results suggest that the likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence 
increases with board size, but decreases with the presence of a woman on the board. No support 
is found for our hypotheses about the proportion of outside directors and the presence of a 
lawyer on the board. Marginal effects results also show that adding one member to the board 
increases the chance of a firm being convicted for an environmental offence by 4.2% while 
having a woman on the board decreases the likelihood of a firm being convicted of an 
environmental offence by 31.8%. 
 
Research limitations/implications 
The sample size of 55 firms is small which could affect the generalisability of the study.  
 
Originality/Value 
The study uses proprietary data obtained from the UK Environmental Agency to provide 
evidence for the first time how corporate boards affect the chances of a listed firm being 
convicted of an environmental offence in the UK.  
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Introduction 
The boards of directors, in particular, are paying more attention to environmental issues due to 
increased concerns over climate change, decreased natural resources, and increased pressure 
from regulators, customers, investors and environmental stakeholders (Dixon-Fowler, 
Ellstrand and Johnson, 2015). In the context of the United Kingdom (UK), one primary source 
of increased pressure on boards of listed firms is the UK Government. For example, the UK 
Government passed the world’s first legally binding Act of Parliament in the form of the 
Climate Change Act 2008.  The Act requires the Government to set legally binding ‘carbon 
budgets’ and commits the UK to reducing emissions by at least 80% by 2050 from the 1990 
levels.  To increase the pressure on listed firms’ environmental performance, the Government 
enacted the Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Reports) Regulations (2013) 
which require quoted companies to report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for which they 
are responsible in their annual reports.  
To underscore the seriousness of poor environmental performance, the UK 
Government’s new sentencing guidelines for environmental offences were brought in, effective 
from the 1st of July, 2014. Under the guidelines, the court will determine the seriousness of the 
offence using two criteria of culpability (deliberate, reckless, negligent or low/no culpability) 
and harm (ranging from 'Category 1' - polluting material of a dangerous nature, major adverse 
effects to people or nature to 'Category 4' - risk of minor, localised adverse effect). The starting 
point for a large organisation for a deliberate ‘Category 1’ environmental offence is a fine of 
£1 million but in most cases the fine will be in the range of £450,000 to £3,000,000. Despite 
the deterrence of these large financial fines, some UK firms are convicted and fined every year 
by the UK Environmental Agency for environmental offence violations. 
 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corporate 
boards and the likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence (a measure of 
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environmental performance) using UK data. Specifically, we investigate whether corporate 
boards’ characteristics (size, the proportion of outside directors, the presence of a woman and 
the presence of a lawyer on the board) are associated with the probability of a firm being 
convicted of an environmental offence. We examine this relationship on the basis that the board 
of directors is at the apex of the decision-making process in many organisations and every 
major strategic decision including the firm’s policy towards the environment must go through 
the board. According to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), even though boards sometimes exert little 
real power over decision making, boards are ultimately responsible for corporate 
environmental strategy.  
This study contributes to growing academic research interest in the efficacy of 
corporate boards in improving environmental performance (e.g., McKendall, Sanchez and 
Sicillian, 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; de Villiers, Naiker and van Staden, 2011; Walls, 
Berrone and Phan, 2012; Post, Rahman and McQuillen, 2015). Together, these studies have 
yielded some useful insights into the effectiveness of corporate boards in enhancing 
environmental performance. For example, Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) found that the likelihood 
of a firm being a lawsuit defendant increased with board size, fraction of directors in industrial 
firms and fraction of inside ownership but decreased with the number of directorships held by 
outside directors. Research by de Villiers et al. (2011) reported that board size, active CEOs 
and law experts on the board of directors have a positive influence on environmental 
performance. A study by Walls et al. (2012) uncovered many significant associations between 
corporate governance and environmental performance, but many in the directions not predicted 
by theories used in past research.  
 
Despite the extent and growth of research on the impact of corporate boards on 
environmental performance, we argue that further research is needed and our research 
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contributes in three main ways. Firstly, our study contributes by providing evidence of the 
efficacy of corporate boards on environmental performance in the UK context, where such 
evidence does not exist. All studies that have drawn their data from a single country to date are 
based on the United States (US) with the exception of Earnhart and Lizal (2006) on Czech 
Republic, Wang and Jin (2007) and Meng, Zeng, Tam & Xu (2013) on China, Ben-Amar and 
McIIkenny (2014) on Canada and Guerci, Longoni & Luzzini (2015) on Italy. A study based 
on a different environment such as the UK will make a significant contribution to our 
understanding of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
environmental performance since the relationship may differ from one country to the other due 
to the legal and cultural differences. For example, Kock and Min (2015) found that a 
shareholder-focused common law legal origin is significantly associated with higher emissions 
of CO2 and that international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol seem to have a more 
pronounced effect in shareholder-centric economies than other economies.  
Secondly, the study also contributes to existing literature by reporting results of the 
relationship between corporate boards and environmental performance based on a more 
objective measure of environmental performance (i.e. environmental offence conviction).  
Apart from McKendall et al. (1999) and Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), the operationalisation of 
environmental performance by existing studies has mostly been that derived from the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini’s (KLD) database (e.g., De Villiers et al., 2011; Walls et al., 2012; 
Dixon-Fowler et al., 2015; Glass et al., 2015; Post  et al., 2015).  Although the database has 
been used extensively, it is acknowledged that it has some limitations as the data is partly based 
on the firm’s self-reported measures (see Walls et al., 2012). Given the difficulties in measuring 
environmental performance, there is a need for further research evidence based on different 
proxies of environmental performance. According to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), the use of a 
conditional measure of environmental performance such as the one employed by the current 
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study has a distinct advantage over subjective assessments such as questionnaires. This is 
because such a measure is a product of an evaluation by an independent government agency, 
in our case the UK Environmental Agency. Thus, the environmental performance measure we 
use is an indication of how the firms measure up to the requirements of the relevant 
environmental legislation. Similar to Kassinis and Vafeas (2002), we argue that our binary 
measure of environmental performance has a high degree of objectivity given the litigation 
costs incurred by the UK Environment Agency in bringing the cases to the court of law and 
securing a conviction. 
Thirdly, our study also contributes by reporting evidence of the marginal effects of the 
different corporate board characteristics on environmental performance. To our knowledge, 
such evidence does not currently exist. Marginal effects show the effects of a one-unit change 
in the independent variable on the probability that the dependent variable is equal to one (in 
our case, that the firm committed an environmental offence). Marginal effects can be an 
informative means of summarizing how changes in board characteristics are related to changes 
in environmental performance. For example, marginal effects will tell us the effect of 
increasing the board size by one member or how the presence of a woman affects the likelihood 
of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence. Such knowledge is important for 
policymakers to improve corporate governance. For example, depending on the marginal 
effects of different corporate governance mechanisms, policymakers may opt to require 
implementation of those mechanisms which have a greater marginal effect on environmental 
performance and at the same time only recommending adoption of those mechanism with a 
less profound effect on environmental performance. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the literature 
review which is subdivided into three subsections dealing with the theoretical framework, prior 
literature and hypotheses development. This is followed by an outline of our research 
5 
 
methodology. We then present and discuss our findings. The final section is a summary and 
conclusion. 
 
Literature Review  
Theoretical framework 
This paper adopts a multi-theoretical approach in explaining why corporate boards would 
influence environmental performance. For example, one such applicable theory is the agency 
theory. Agency theory is concerned with the problems that can arise in any cooperative 
exchange when one party (the principal) contracts with another (the agent) to make decisions 
on behalf of the principals (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Agency costs will arise because agents 
(managers) can hide information and/or take actions that favour their own interests. Agency 
theory provides the rationale for the board’s critical function of monitoring management on 
behalf of the shareholders (Eisenhart, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In order to exercise its 
monitoring function, the board needs the appropriate mix of experience and capabilities to 
evaluate management and assess business strategies and their impact on corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
Stakeholder theory is also applicable in explaining the relationship between corporate 
boards and environmental performance. Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines a stakeholder as ‘an 
individual or group who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s 
objectives’.  Stakeholder theory therefore recognises that a variety of constituency groups have 
legitimate claims upon the organisation and can affect the organisational outcomes. According 
to stakeholder theory, organisations are viewed as social institutions which have 
responsibilities over and above fiduciary responsibility to shareholders (Carroll, 1979) such as 
protecting the environment. Although, stakeholder and agency theories have different origins, 
it has been suggested they have something in common. For example, it has been suggested that 
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both agency theory and stakeholder theory particularly considering instrumental stakeholders, 
view the firm as a network of contracts with stakeholders (Fama, 1980; Jones, 1995; Mcguire, 
Dow & Argheyd, 2003).  
Resource dependency theory, which offers the rationale for the board’s function of 
providing critical resources to the firm including legitimacy, advice and counsel (Hillman and 
Dalziel, 2003),  has also been widely used to explain why corporate boards will influence 
financial performance and can similarly explain why the board can influence environmental 
performance. According to Johnson et al. (1996), directors serve three primary roles: control, 
resource dependence and service. In that regard, directors use their expertise and experience to 
monitor managerial performance, secure important resources, provide expert advice, and 
oversee strategy development and implementation.  According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
and Boyd (1990), directors also play a resource dependence role, enhancing firm performance 
by linking a firm with important constituencies. This is consistent with the suggestion that the 
directors, through their external networks, can help a firm in reducing uncertainty and securing 
valuable resources (e.g., Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman et al., 2000).  
Directors play a service role by using their expertise to advise the chief executive officer 
and top management team and are active in reviewing and ratifying strategic initiatives (e.g., 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Thus the directors help to determine the 
overall strategy of the firm and influence firm-level decision-making, performance and other 
outcomes which may include environmental performance (e.g., Hill and Snell, 1988; Johnson 
et al., 1996). From a service perspective, directors may be concerned with their firm’s strategy 
and act in the best interests of shareholders because they view the firm’s performance as a 
reflection of their own abilities and reputation (Fama 1980; Davis et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 
1996). According to Daily et al. (2003) directors essentially manage their own reputations by 
acting as a steward of a firm.  
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Prior studies  
Although there are a number of prior studies that have examined the relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (which includes environmental 
performance) (e.g., Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; David, Bloom and 
Hillman, 2007; Bear, Rahman and Post, 2010), this literature review concentrates on those 
studies that specifically investigated the impact of corporate governance on environmental 
performance. A study by McKendall et al. (1999) was the first to investigate the effect of board 
structure on environmental performance. The study examined how different corporate boards 
are related to the likelihood of a firm committing a non-serious or a serious environmental 
violation. The results indicated that the value of stocks owned by corporate officers and 
directors was positively and significantly associated with serious environmental violations. 
This positive association was rationalised by saying that directors may be more likely to ignore 
compliance with environmental law if they expect such action to increase company profits and 
hence their personal wealth. Outsider dominance, joint CEO-chairpersons, social responsibility 
committees, and attorneys on the boards were not significantly related to corporate illegal 
behaviour. The control variables of size, industry profitability, firm profitability and industry 
concentration were found to be significantly related to environmental violations. 
Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) questioned why each year hundreds of US firms were 
prosecuted for violating environmental laws and fined hundreds of millions of dollars in 
penalties yet others avoided the penalties by adhering to the provisions of the environmental 
laws. The study compared the pre-lawsuit profile of 209 firms which were subject to 
environmental offence litigations to a sample of matched control firms. The findings suggest 
that the likelihood of a firm being a lawsuit defendant increased with board size, fraction of 
directors in industrial firms and fraction of inside ownership, but decreased with the number of 
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directorships held by outside directors.  Craig and Dibrell (2006), among others, also 
investigated the differences between family and non-family owned firms on natural 
environment related policies. Using data from questionnaire responses from a sample of 396 
small and medium sized enterprises, the study reported that family firms are better able to 
facilitate environmentally friendly firm policies than non-family owned firms.  
Earnhart and Lizal (2006) analysed the effects of ownership on environmental 
performance and also how financial performance affects environmental performance using an 
unbalanced data panel of Czech firms from 1993 to 1998. The study found that increased state 
ownership improves environmental performance relative to all other types of ownership types. 
Earnhart and Lizal (2006) also found evidence that successful financial performance improves 
future environmental performance, which, the authors argue, is consistent with the hypothesis 
that a liquidity constraint may be limiting investment in activities that directly or indirectly 
lower emissions. Wang and Jin (2007) also investigated the efficacy of different types of 
ownership on environmental performance in China. Specifically, the study examined the 
differences in pollution control performance of industries that were state owned enterprises 
(SOE), collectively or community owned (COE) and privately owned enterprises (POE). The 
findings of the study indicate that the COEs have better environmental performances in water 
pollution discharges than the SOEs and the POEs. 
Salo (2008) argues that, while both corporate governance and environmental 
performance are increasingly examined within the financial market place, there is a very 
limited empirical research that examines them both together. The study therefore sets out to 
examine the link between corporate governance and environmental performance. Salo (2008) 
concluded that the findings did not suggest that there was a direct correlation between corporate 
governance and environmental performance. Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) investigated 
the relationship between environmental performance and executive compensation. They found 
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that, in polluting industries, good environmental performance increases CEO pay and that 
environmental governance mechanisms strengthen this linkage. 
Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia and Larraza-Kintana (2010) investigated the differences 
in environmental performance between family owned and non-family owned public US 
companies. They found that family controlled public firms protect the socioemotional wealth 
by having a better environmental performance than their nonfamily counterparts, particularly 
at the local level, and that for non-family firms, stock ownership by the CEO has a negative 
environmental impact. de Villiers et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between a strong 
firm environmental performance and board characteristics that capture boards’ monitoring and 
resource provision abilities. Specifically, the study investigated the influence of  board 
characteristics that represent boards’ monitoring role (independence, CEO-duality, 
concentration of directors appointed after CEO, and director shareholding) and resource 
provision role (board size, directors on multiple boards, CEOs of other firms on the board, 
lawyers on the board, and director tenure). The findings suggest a positive relationship between 
board size, larger representation of active CEOs on the board, and legal experts on the board 
and environmental performance. 
Kock, Santalo and Diestre (2012) relied on the stakeholder-agency theory in 
investigating the impact of  exposure to the market for corporate control, managerial exposure 
to the legal and regulatory systems, influence of stakeholders over corporate board and equity 
based managerial incentives on environmental performance (waste and toxic waste). The 
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between exposure to the market for corporate 
control, managerial exposure to the legal and regulatory systems and environmental 
performance (waste). The results also indicate a negative relationship between influence of 
stakeholders over corporate board and equity based managerial incentives and environmental 
performance (waste and toxic waste). 
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A study by Walls et al. (2012) investigated how the relationships between and among 
the firms’ owners, managers and boards of directors influence environmental performance. The 
study uncovered many significant associations between corporate governance and 
environmental performance. For example, the findings suggest a positive relationship between 
environmental committee and environmental strength and also a positive relationship between 
environmental committee, board independence, board size, CEO salary and shareholder 
activism. They also indicated that the corporate governance-environmental performance may 
be different for those firms operating in other nations under different governance regimes. 
Calza, Profumo and Tutore (2014) investigated the relationship between corporate 
ownership and environmental proactivity. The results show that ownership structure matters in 
firms’ environmental proactivity. In particular, firms with higher percentage of state ownership 
present superior green proactivity, while ownership concentration appears negatively related 
to proactive environmental strategy. Their sample excluded UK as a typical market based 
system characterised by different corporate ownership. 
Ortiz-de-Mandojana & Aragon-Correa (2015) highlight the importance of a firm’s 
board with respect to the sustainability issue by analysing the relationship between director 
interlocks and a firm’s environmental performance. The paper utilises the insights from a 
resource based view and research on social capital to demonstrate that environmental 
performance of a firm is also influenced by a difficulty to imitate capabilities that are embedded 
in the networks and relationships of its directors. The results indicate that director interlocks 
are positively connected with the environmental performance of a firm. 
A study by Post et al. (2015) argues that, although there is a growing body of work 
suggesting a link between the presence of women and independent directors on boards and 
environmental performance, the channels through which this link is established were not well 
understood. The study therefore tested the mediating role of sustainability-themed alliances in 
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the relationship between board composition and environmental performance. The results 
indicated that the higher the representation of women on the board, the more likely the firm is 
to form sustainability-themed alliances. Post et al. (2015) also found that the higher the 
representation of independent directors on the firm’s board, the more likely the firm was to 
form sustainability-themed alliances. 
A study by Kock and Min (2015) found support for their hypothesis that a shareholder 
focused common law legal origin is associated with significantly higher emissions of CO2, and 
also that international environmental agreements like the Kyoto Protocol seem to have a more 
pronounced effect in shareholder centric economies than thus far assumed.  
Glass, Cook and Ingersoll (2015) investigated the impact women leaders had on the 
corporate environmental strategies of organisations. The findings revealed that the effects of 
gender diversity on environmental practice are nuanced and context dependent. Specifically, 
the study found no significant effect of women CEOs on environmental practice. Despite 
previous research indicating that women leaders are more likely than men CEOs to strengthen 
the environmental practices of firms the study found no such evidence. The study however 
found that board interlock was positively associated with environmental strength but not 
environmental concerns. 
Dixon-Fowler et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between the existence of board 
environmental committees, stakeholder representation, presence of a sustainability manager 
and environmental performance. The results indicated that there was a positive association 
between the existence of a board environmental committee and environmental performance. 
The presence of senior-level environmental manager positively moderates this relationship but 
is not effective in isolation. The study found no support for influences of stakeholder 
representation. 
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Thus overall, there is growing literature that has investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance and environmental performance. However, as argued before, most of the 
literature is US centric and very little is known about the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and environmental performance in other countries. This research is a 
step toward filling that gap in literature. 
 
Hypotheses development 
Board size 
Existing literature indicates that larger boards may be associated with superior environmental 
performance because such boards are likely to include more experienced and knowledgeable 
directors who possess better expertise to manage environmental issues. For example, according 
to de Villiers et al. (2011), larger boards are more likely to be diverse and include directors 
with different skill sets and foci. This increases the likelihood that a director or some directors 
have been exposed to the effects of the environmental agenda. This is consistent with 
Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994) who suggested that corporate boards may be able to 
have an effect on the company’s environmental performance on the basis that resource 
dependence theory suggests that larger boards enhance firm performance by ensuring greater 
ability of firms to form links to their environmentally critical resources. The increased 
resources in terms of expertise and networks would allow larger corporate boards valuable 
financial leeway towards achieving more environmentally responsible behaviour.  Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) suggest that as the number of corporate directors rises there are more people to 
draw on, providing management with otherwise unobtainable expert advice. Consequently, it 
can be expected that a greater number of directors may reduce the likelihood of a firm being 
convicted for an environmental offence. 
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 Birnbaum (1984) finds that uncertainty and lack of information are mitigated by larger 
board sizes. However, Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that large boards are not as cohesive in 
initiating strategic action compared to smaller boards. Consequently, larger boards perform 
less strategic planning and may encounter more problems in setting and implementing an 
acceptable agenda on the environment. Also, according to agency theory, larger boards 
experience process losses while they also hinder the free exchange of ideas among board 
members. Consistent with these arguments, Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) and de Villiers et al. 
(2011) found a positive relationship between board size and environmental performance. 
However, Walls et al. (2012) found no significant relationship between board size and 
environmental performance. We therefore hypothesize as follows: 
H1 The likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence is positively     
    associated with board size. 
 
Proportion of outside directors 
The link between outside directors and environmental performance can be explained in terms 
of a number of theories and arguments.  For example, Post et al. (2015) suggest that following 
agency theory logic, among the outside directors, the independent ones, are expected to have 
greater impact on corporate governance. This is because independent directors are primarily 
interested in aligning with stakeholder interests and using their contacts and business expertise 
to participate in the strategy of the focal firm to maintain or enhance their own reputations, 
which are intertwined with addressing stakeholder issues. According to Zahra, Oviatt & 
Minyard (1993), the number of outside directors on a company’s board increases the racial, 
ethnic and gender diversity of the firm. The resource dependence framework suggests that the 
selection of outside members can be viewed as a strategy for dealing with an organisation’s 
relationship with its environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition, outside directors 
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may enhance the reputation and credibility of an organisation and help to establish and maintain 
its legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Since outside directors have reputations to protect (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and are hired 
to help manage external constituencies, including local communities (Pfeffer, 1972), they will 
presumably feel that investments in the quality of products and services are in the best interests 
of shareholders. According to Johnson and Greening (1999), outside directors, representing 
many constituencies and being knowledgeable about the critical contingencies facing firms, 
may be more inclined to comply with environmental standards to avoid penalties, fines and 
negative media exposure and a subsequent loss of reputation, all of which will affect future 
profit. Empirical evidence for the effectiveness of outside directors is however mixed. For 
example, Boeker and Goodstein (1991) found some support for effectiveness of outside 
directors as resource acquisitions agents.  However, Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) did not 
find evidence to suggest that outside directors influence environmental performance. We 
therefore hypothesize as follows: 
H2 The likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence is negatively  
     associated with the proportion of outside directors. 
Board diversity 
According to Glass et al. (2015), while gender socialization perspective predicts that women 
CEOs will be more likely than men CEOs to pursue environmentally friendly policies, there is 
also evidence to suggest that gender diverse boards will be more amenable to environmentally 
sustainable practices than non-diverse boards.  Research by Post, Rahman and Rubow (2011) 
found evidence that firms with a critical mass on the board spend more time on environmental 
and corporate social responsibility concerns. Hillman et al. (2002) concluded that the presence 
of women on the board is expected to have a positive impact on environmental performance 
since women are more educated than their male counterparts. For example, on boards, women 
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are more than twice as likely as men to hold a doctoral degree. Female directors are more likely 
than male directors to have expert backgrounds outside business and to bring a different 
perspective to the board (Hillman et al., 2002).  In addition women on boards are more likely 
than men to support specialists and community initiatives (Hillman et al., 2002). Therefore 
having more female directors may sensitize boards to CSR initiatives and provide perspectives 
that can be helpful in addressing CSR issues.  
On the assumption that that gender differences in leadership styles also exist at board 
director levels, the presence of female directors may stimulate more participative 
communication among board members (Eagly, Johannesen-Schmidt & van Engen, 2003) and  
perhaps a more communal atmosphere than in an all-male board (Rudman and Glick, 2001). 
Therefore, having more women on board could encourage more open conversation among 
members of the board. A broader perspective may enable the board to better assess the needs 
of diverse stakeholders. The result may enhance the board’s ability to effectively address CSR. 
Hillman et al. (2002) also suggested that having more women on the board enhances the board’s 
expertise by increasing the range of professional experience and augmenting the number of 
board members with advanced degrees. These added qualities brought about by female board 
members enable the board to monitor management more effectively (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). Empirical results on the relationship between proportion of outside directors and 
environmental performance is, however, mixed. For example, Glass et al. (2015) found that the 
proportion of women on the board has an effect on environmental strengths but not weaknesses 
while Post et al. (2015) found that the higher the representation of women on the board, the 
more likely the firm is to form sustainability-themed alliances. We therefore hypothesize as 
follows: 
H3 The likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence is negatively  
     associated with the presence of women on the boards. 
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Presence of lawyers on the board 
The suggestion that the presence of lawyers on the board of directors can have an impact on 
environmental performance is based on the evidence that appropriate experience and expertise 
of board members is associated with superior outcomes (e.g., Kroll, Walters and Wright, 2008; 
McDonald, Westphal and Graeber, 2008). This is especially so given that that lawyers are more 
likely to possess the analytical skills to assess environmental opportunities and be 
knowledgeable about the stakeholder impacts of environmental actions (de Villiers et al., 
2011). Chamberlain (1982) also suggests that lawyers bring a necessary perspective to boards 
because they are sworn to uphold the judicial system, they understand legal liability, and they 
are more cognizant of the public effects of corporate choices.  
We suggest that corporate boards with one or more members who are qualified as an 
attorney will have legal advice at their disposal and thus the ability to ask broader questions 
about any proposed action involving environmental law thus are less likely to be in breach of 
the law. Another reason for expecting the presence of lawyers on the board to impact 
environmental performance is that lawyers are held to a higher professional standard, have a 
better understanding of the legal environment, and are more adept at dealing with politically 
sensitive areas such as the environmental performance (Harris and Valihura, 1998). Since 
lawyers are held to a higher professional standard similar to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), we 
argue that a board of directors that has a lawyer as at least one of its members has readily 
accessible expertise that can help the board to maintain its legitimacy.  
Empirical evidence of how the presence of a lawyer on the board affects environmental 
conviction is mixed. For example, while de Villiers et al. (2011) found evidence in support of 
the effectiveness of the presence of lawyers on the board on environmental performance, 
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McKendall et al. (1999) did not find a significant relationship. We therefore hypothesize as 
follows: 
H4 The likelihood of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence is negatively    
     associated with the presence of lawyers on the boards. 
 
Control Variables 
We control for a number of underlying firm-specific characteristics that could influence 
environmental performance. First, firm size is known to be a proxy for a number of factors 
such as public visibility; large firms tend to attract the attention of diverse stakeholders, who 
use intense pressure and scrutiny to force them to engage in environmental management as a 
way of maintaining their legitimacy within their operating environment. The majority of studies 
have found a significant positive relationship between firm size and environmental 
performance (e.g., McKendall et al., 1999; Cordeiro and Sarkis, 2008; Berrone and Gomez-
Mejia, 2009; Walls et al., 2012). Secondly, we control for leverage (measured as a ratio of long 
term debt scaled by shareholders’ equity plus long term debt), considered to be a measure of 
risk to which both equity holders and debt holders are exposed. Kock et al. (2012), Walls et al. 
(2012) and Meng et al. (2013) found financial leverage to have a significant influence on 
environmental performance. Finally, we also control for firm profitability. McKendall et al. 
(1999) found profitability to be related to environmental performance. However, Dixon-Fowler 
et al. (2015) found no significant relationship.  
 
 
Methodology 
Data and sample 
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The population of our study are the 74 London Stock Exchange listed firms that were identified 
as having been convicted of an environmental offence over a 15 year period between 2000 and 
2014 according to the data obtained from the Environment Agency under the UK Freedom of 
Information Act 2000.  Given that some of the firms have either gone out of business, merged 
or have been taken over, we were able to obtain data for 51 of those firms.  These firms were 
then matched with 51 similar firms on the basis of firm size (total assets), year of conviction 
and industry. However, because some of the 51 companies were convicted more than once over 
the 15 year period, we were therefore able to include the same firm twice or more depending 
on the number of times it was convicted. This increased the sample size to 55 firm years for 
the convicted firms. These were then matched with 55 other firms on the basis of year of 
conviction, size (total assets) and industry.  Therefore, the results reported in this study are 
based on 110 firm years. The analysis of the firms and their matched pairs is presented in Table 
1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The table shows that most of the companies convicted belonged to the consumer services 
industry consisting of 40% of all environmental convictions. This is followed by the consumer 
goods industry with 25.45% of the convictions. The fact that the consumer industry has the 
most convictions suggests that the government is very keen to protect the members of the 
public. Apart from these two, ‘industrials’ is the only other industry that has a significant 
number of firms being convicted of an environmental offence in our sample with 10.91% of 
the firms. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Empirical strategy  
Regarding empirical analysis, the following probit model was estimated: 
 
ENVP = β0 + β1BOSZ +β2PROD +   β3BODI + β4LAWB + β5FISZ + β6LEVR + β7PROF + ε   
  
Where ENVP is the dependent binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is being convicted of an 
environmental offence, and zero otherwise. The variables of interest are the board size (BOSZ), 
a binary variable for the presence of women on board (BODI), a binary variable for the presence 
of non-executive directors on board (PROD), a binary variable for the presence of lawyers on 
board (LAWB). Control variables include firms’ total assets (FISZ), leverage (LEVR) and the 
level of profitability (PROF) (see Table 2 for the variable definitions). Finally, ε denotes the 
error term.  
The choice of the estimation model is dictated by the nature of the dependent variable. Namely, 
given that the dependent variable is a binary indicator taking on values of 0 and 1, applying the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator would produce biased estimate. Therefore, we need 
to employ a discrete choice model, either probit or logit (logistic). The former assumes that the 
error terms in the model follow a standard normal distribution, whereas the latter relies on the 
assumption that the error terms follow a standard logistic distribution (Wooldridge, 2008, p. 
577). We first estimated the probit model and tested the assumption of normality in error terms 
utilizing the Lagrange Multiplier Test. The test indicates that the null hypothesis of normality 
in error terms cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance (the results are 
available upon request). Therefore, we report the results from the probit model. To take into 
account heteroscedasticity of the error terms, we report bootstrapped standard errors (the 
number of replications is 1,000). 
 
Results and Discussion 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. Because the 
sample consists of matched firms, the mean of the dependent variable ENVP is 0.5. The average 
board has seven members, while the average for the proportion of non-executive directors is 
24 percent.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A rather small number of boards have a female member (14 percent), and similarly, only 10 
percent of firms have a lawyer on board. The average total assets (firm size) are 
£50,123,474.04, while the average leverage is 69.1 percent. Finally, the average value of 
profitability (return on assets) is 4.47%. Detailed descriptive statistics for the subsamples of 
environment offenders and firms without environment offence is given in Table 4.  
 We have also tested the differences in the means of independent variables between 
matched firms, i.e. those firms that were convicted of environmental offence and similar firms 
that were not convicted. The results are presented in Table 4.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results show that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses of no difference 
in means at any conventional significance levels for the following variables: the presence of 
non-executive directors on board (PROD), presence of lawyers on board (LAWB), firms' total 
assets (FISZ), leverage (LEVR) and profitability (PROF). For the board size (BOSZ) and its 
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diversity (BODI), the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% level, but it can be rejected 
at the 10% level of significance.1 
 The pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables are 
reported in Table 5. The correlations are overall weak to moderate (Taylor, 1990), therefore 
we proceed with the estimation of the model. The choice of the estimation model is dictated by 
the nature of the dependent variable. Namely, given that the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator taking on values of 0 and 1, we can either estimate the probit or the logit (logistic) 
model. The former assumes that the error terms in the model follow a standard normal 
distribution, whereas the latter relies on the assumption that the error terms follow a standard 
logistic distribution (Wooldridge, 2008, p. 577). We first estimated the probit model and tested 
the assumption of normality in error terms utilizing the Lagrange Multiplier Test. The test 
indicates that the null hypothesis of normality in error terms cannot be rejected at any 
conventional level of significance (the results are available upon request). Therefore, we report 
the results from the probit model. To take into account heteroscedasticity of the error terms, 
we report bootstrapped standard errors (the number of replications is 1,000). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients and the corresponding marginal effects. Our 
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is qualitative, i.e. discussing their signs and 
statistical significance, while marginal effects will be interpreted quantitatively. With respect 
to the variables of interest, the estimated coefficients suggest that the board size (BOSZ) has a 
positive and marginally significant impact on environment performance (at the 10% level of 
significance). This means that our hypothesis 1 (H1) which predicted a positive relationship 
                                                          
1 The results are available upon request. 
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with environmental performance (ENVP) is accepted. In contrast, board diversity (BODI) has 
a negative and statistically significant impact (at the 5% level of significance). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
These results means that our hypothesis 3 (H3) is accepted while our hypothesis 4 (H4) is 
rejected at all conventional levels of significance. The presence of non-executive directors on 
the board (PROD) has no impact on firm environment performance. This means our hypothesis 
2 (H2) is rejected. Regarding control variables, our results indicate no impact of firm size 
(FISZ), leverage (LEVR) and profitability (PROF) on the probability of a firm being convicted 
of an environmental offence. 
 Next, we turn our focus on the interpretation of marginal effects at the sample mean, 
showing the instantaneous changes in the dependent variable (ENVP) when the variables of 
interest with respect to the corporate boards change by one unit of measure (Figure 1 presents 
all marginal effects graphically). When the board size (BOSZ) increases by an additional 
director, the probability of a firm being convicted for an environment offence increases by 4.2 
percentage points.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Firms with boards with female members (BODI) are less likely to be convicted for an 
environmental offence by 34.1 percentage points, relative to their counterparts without female 
board members. Although our results hint at a negative association between the proportion of 
outside directors (PROD) and the probability of environment offence (i.e. the larger the number 
of outside directors on the board, the smaller the probability of environmental offence), its 
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estimated coefficient and the corresponding marginal effect are not statistically significant at 
any conventional level. Finally, the estimated marginal effects for control variables are also 
statistically insignificant at any conventional level. 
 Figure 2 shows how the probability of environmental offence changes as the number of 
directors on a board (BOSZ) rises. The trend in probability is positive, which means that the 
more directors the board has, the higher the probability of an environmental offence.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The likelihood of committing an environmental offence for firms with the smallest number of 
directors on boards (two directors) is 30 percentage points, while the likelihood for firms with 
the largest number of directors (15 directors) on board is 80 percentage points.  
 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates marginal effects of having a female member on board. While the 
probability of committing an environmental offence is 54.8 percentage points for firms in 
which boards with no female members, while for firms in which boards have a female member, 
this probability is 22.2 percentage points. Figure 4 presents marginal effects of board size for 
those boards with no female members (BODI=0) and for those with at least one female member 
(BODI=1). The graph shows that boards with up to eight members and at least one female 
member have no impact on the probability of an environmental offence (at the 5% level of 
significance). That is, the presence of a female member(s) neutralizes the impact of board size 
on the probability of an environmental offence up to a certain size of the board.  
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[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The presence of a female member reduces to the point of insignificance the impact of the board 
size on the probability of an environmental offence if the board has less than eight members. 
In contrast, when the board reaches eight or more members, the effects become positive and 
highly statistically significant although the presence of female member(s) decreases the size of 
the effects relative to boards without female members. 
  
Discussion 
The results of our investigation, which indicate that the larger the board of directors, the higher 
the chances of the firm being convicted of an environmental offence, are consistent with studies 
by Kassinis and Vafeas (2002) and de Villiers et al (2011), which were all based on the US 
data. These results are also consistent with the argument that large boards are not as cohesive 
in initiating strategic action compared to smaller boards and that as a result perform less 
strategic planning and may encounter more problems in setting and implementing an 
acceptable agenda on the environment. Our finding of a statistically significant negative 
association between the presence of a woman on the board and the likelihood of a firm being 
convicted of an environmental offence is also consistent with growing literature showing the 
effectiveness of women on the board of directors (e.g., Glass et al., 2015; Post el al., 2015). 
These findings are also consistent with the suggestion by Hillman et al. (2002)  that women on 
boards are more likely than men to be support specialists and individuals with influence in the 
community  and that having more female directors may sensitize boards to CSR initiatives. 
Our finding that there is no support for the hypothesis that the likelihood of a firm being 
convicted of an environmental offence is negatively associated with the presence of a lawyer 
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on the board is consistent with McKendall et al. (1999) but inconsistent with de Villiers (2011) 
both of which are based on US data. Although the finding seems to contradict the suggestion 
by Chamberlain (1982) that boards with lawyers will be more effective because lawyers 
understand legal liability, the finding may be due to the fact that we only considered whether 
there was a lawyer on the board or not, without taking into account the proportion of lawyers 
on the board. It may well be that when it comes to voting, the lawyers are in the minority.  
Finally, the finding that the proportion of outside directors is not associated with the probability 
of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence suggests that outside directors may not 
be effective in improving firms’ environmental performance. The finding is consistent with 
Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) and Walls et al. (2012) who reported similar results using 
US data. 
 Overall, the results reported suggest that there are some similarities and also differences 
with extant literature mainly based on US data on the relationship between corporate boards 
and environmental performance (e.g. Mckendall et al., 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; de 
Villiers et al., 2011 and Walls et al., 2012). However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first time that the relationship between corporate boards and environmental performance has 
been investigated in the context of the UK. Our findings, therefore, add to the understanding 
of how corporate boards affect environmental performance specifically in the context of the 
UK. Moreover, our use of a conditional measure of environmental performance (i.e. 
environmental offence conviction) has a clear advantage over subjective assessments such as 
questionnaires because it is a product of an assessment by an independent government agency, 
in our case the UK Environmental Agency. Thus, we argue that our binary measure of 
environmental performance has a high degree of objectivity given the litigation costs incurred 
by the UK Environment Agency in bringing the cases to the courts of law.  
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Finally, and perhaps more importantly, we have been able to show the marginal effect 
of corporate board’s characteristics on the likelihood of a firm being convicted of an 
environmental offence. For example, we have been able to show that an increase in the board 
by one director increases the chance of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence by 
4.2 percentage points and that boards with at least one female member are 34.1 percentage 
points less likely to be convicted of an environmental offence. These findings are important for 
those charged with the function of improving the corporate governance as they clearly show 
that the presence of a woman on the board makes a big difference in the likelihood of a firm 
being convicted of an environmental offence.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
This paper investigated the relationship between corporate board characteristics (board 
size, proportion of outside directors, presence of a woman and presence of a lawyer on the 
board) and the probability of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence. We found 
that the probability of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence increases with board 
size but decreases with the presence of women on the board. We then reported the marginal 
effects of board size and presence of a woman on the board. Specifically, the results show that 
each additional director to the board increases the chance of environmental offence conviction 
by 4.2 percentage points and the presence of a woman on the board decreases the likelihood of 
an environmental conviction by 34.1 percentage points. We also reported a moderating role of 
female board members on the impact of board size on the likelihood of an environmental 
offence. When the board has less than eight members, the presence of a female board member 
reduces to insignificance the impact of board size on the probability of an environmental 
offence. In contrast, when the board reaches eight or more members, the size impact on the 
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likelihood of an environmental offence becomes positive and significant, although its 
magnitude is reduced by the presence of a female member. 
 Our findings should be interpreted in the light of the following limitations. Our analysis 
is based on cross section data and therefore the results are not indicative of the relationship 
between corporate boards and environmental offence conviction over time. Moreover, in the 
cross-sectional setting, we are unable to control for the time effects and the effects of changes 
with respect to governance and environmental regulations. Another limitation of our study is 
the limited sample size of 110 firm years. However, this equates to roughly 70% of the 
population of the listed firms convicted between 2000 and 2014 and thus the sample is 
representative. Also because of the limited number of firms convicted of environmental 
offences, we were only able to incorporate a few corporate board characteristics. It is possible 
that some of the corporate boards characteristics not examined in this study such as ownership 
structure and presence of environmental committees are more significant determinants of 
environmental offence conviction. 
Despite these limitations, on the basis of the findings reported, our study contributes to 
the existing literature in three main ways. Firstly, the study is unique in that it is the first study 
in the UK context to empirically investigate the association of corporate boards with the 
probability of a firm being convicted of an environmental offence – a proxy for environmental 
performance. Despite the differences in corporate governance arrangements between the UK 
and US, the results reported in this study are mostly consistent with similar studies based on 
the US data, such as McKendall et al. (1999) and Kassinis and Vafeas (2002). Secondly, our 
study also contributes to existing literature because it uses a conditional measure of 
environmental performance (i.e. conviction) that has clear advantages over subjective 
assessments such as questionnaires. From a practical point of view, the results are important to 
the firms and also policy makers. For example, given that a large board is costly in financial 
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terms, our results indicate that firms need to consider having smaller boards in order to be more 
effective in avoiding environmental convictions. In addition, the firms also need to make sure 
that they have women on their boards which will reduce the probability of environmental 
conviction. In the light of our findings, the UK policy makers need to consider making it a 
requirement to have women on the board as it may lead to improvement in environmental 
performance. Thirdly, unlike existing research on the relationship between corporate boards 
and environmental performance (e.g. Mckendall et al., 1999; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) we 
have been able to show the marginal effect of corporate board characteristics (board size and 
presence of a woman on the board) on the likelihood of environmental conviction. We argue 
that showing the marginal effect of these corporate board characteristics are important for 
policy makers in improving corporate governance of firms. 
Given that this study is the first to examine the link between corporate boards and 
environmental offence conviction, future studies may wish to investigate whether other 
corporate board characteristics such as chief executive age, directors’ stock ownership and the 
presence of environmental committees are associated with the likelihood of a firm being 
convicted on an environmental offence. Another potential area of future research is the 
investigation of the relationship between corporate boards and the likelihood of environmental 
offence conviction using data of private firms. This is because to date, our knowledge of the 
association between corporate boards and environmental performance is based on public listed 
firms. The differences in the scale of agency costs and corporate governance arrangements 
between public and private firms may mean that the association between the corporate boards 
and environmental performance will differ depending on the type of firm. Finally, it would be 
useful to compare our findings to those from other European countries to deduce on the 
generalizability of our findings.  
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Table 1: ICB Industrial Classification of firms convicted of environmental violations 
Industry Number of 
firms 
Number of convictions Percent of sample* 
Financials 1 1    1.82 
Consumer Services 19 22  40.00 
Consumer Goods 13 14  25.45 
Industrials 6 6  10.91 
Utilities 1 1    1.82 
Telecommunications 2 2    3.64 
Technology 3 3    5.45 
Healthcare 2 2    3.64 
Oil and gas 1 1    1.82 
Basic Materials 3 3    5.45 
Total 51 55 100.00 
*based on number of convictions 
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Table 2: Independent and dependent variables definitions 
Variables Acronym Measurement 
Dependent   
Environment performance ENVP Measured as a dummy variable assuming the 
value of 1 if a firm was convicted for an 
environmental offence anytime between 
2000 and 2015; 0 otherwise. 
Independent Variables 
Corporate Boards 
Board size BOSZ The total number of all directors on the board 
of a firm at the preceding annual report date. 
Proportion of non-executive 
directors 
PROD Proportion of non-executive directors, 
measured as the total number of non-
executive directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the firm’s board of 
directors at the preceding annual report date. 
Board diversity BODI Measured as a dummy variable assuming the 
value of 1 if a firm has a woman on the board 
of directors; 0 otherwise, as at the preceding 
annual report date. 
Lawyers on the board LAWB Measured as a dummy variable assuming the 
value of 1 if a firm has a lawyer on the board 
of directors; 0 otherwise, as at the preceding 
annual report date. 
Control variables 
Firm size FISZ Firm size measured in terms of the natural 
log of total assets at the preceding annual 
report date. 
Leverage LEVR Measured as long-term debt divided by 
shareholders’ funds plus long-term 
loans at the preceding annual report date. 
Profitability PROF Profit before interest and tax divided by total 
assets at the preceding annual report date. 
35 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
ENVP 0.50 0.50 0 1 
BOSZ 6.99 3.14 2 15 
PROD 0.24 0.25 0 0.78 
BODI 0.15 0.35 0 1 
LAWB 0.09 0.29 0 1 
FISZ (in natural 
logarithm) 
17.73 2.81 9.90 23.72 
FISZ (in £) 50,123,474.04 16.61 19,930.37 20,020,047,831.17 
LEVR 0.27 0.25 0 0.92 
PROF 0.11 0.16 -0.01 1.51 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the sample by environment offence.  
 Firms with environment 
offence (n=55) 
Firms without environment 
offence (n=55) 
Mann-
Whitney 
test 
Chi-
square Variable 
Mean Median 25% 75% SD Mean Median 25% 75% SD 
BOSZ 7.53 8 5 10 3.25 6.45 7 4 9 2.95 -1.69* - 
PROD 0.24 0.14 0 0.42 0.26 0.25 0.25 0 0.44 0.25 0.42 - 
BODI 0.07 0 0 0 0.26 0.22 0 0 0 0.42 - 4.68** 
LAWB 0.05 0 0 0 0.23 0.13 0 0 0 0.34 - 1.76 
FISZ (in 
natural 
logarithm) 
17.96 17.79 15.62 20.58 2.99 17.50 17.99 16.04 19.49 2.61 -0.61 - 
FISZ (in £s) 63,085,404.92 53,222,936.57 6,076,868.06 866,523,684.26 19.89 39,824,784.40 65,006,641.53 9,248,759.57 291,339,554.84 13.6 - - 
LEVR 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.39 0.23 0.27 0.17 0 0.46 0.27 -0.34 - 
PROF 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.22 0.64 - 
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
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Table 5. Correlation matrix  
 BOSZ PROD BODI LAWB FISZ LEVR PROF 
BOSZ 1.000       
PROD 0.535*** 1.000      
BODI 0.158* 0.184* 1.000     
LAWB 0.173* 0.282*** 0.049 1.000    
FISZ 0.534*** 0.513*** 0.209** 0.074 1.000   
LEVR 0.198** 0.154 0.176* -0.016 0.118 1.000  
PROF 0.006 -0.042 0.010 0.249*** 0.043 -0.086 1.000 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05; * p<0.10. 
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Table 6. Results from the probit model.  
 
Independent variables  Coefficients Marginal effects  
Variables of interest   
BOSZ 0.117* 0.042* 
 (0.066) (0.022) 
PROD -0.706 -0.251 
 (0.785) (0.274) 
BODI -0.958** -0.341** 
 (0.453) (0.150) 
LAWB -0.573 -0.204 
 (0.544) (0.190) 
Control variables   
FISZ 0.036 0.013 
 (0.065) (0.023) 
LEVR -0.082 -0.029 
 (0.580) (0.206) 
PROF -0.989 -0.352 
 (1.512) (0.533) 
Constant -0.985  
 (0.978)  
No of observations 110 110 
Log likelihood 68.661  
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (number of replications is 1,000); *** p<0.01,  
** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Figure 1. Average marginal effects from Table 6. 
 
Figure 2. Adjusted predictions of the board size (BOSZ). 
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Figure 3. Adjusted predictions of the board diversity (BODI). 
 
Figure 4. Adjusted predictions of the board size (BOSZ) with and without female 
members (BODI). 
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